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ince January 2002, the Eurozone countries have adopted a common 
currency. The consumers – be they firms or individuals – can now pay 
throughout Europe using similar coins and notes. However, the 
conditions under which the other payment instruments are used in each 
European country remain disparate. To date, each country has its own legal 
framework and technical standards. This variance in the organization of 
payments is to be explained by history: most payment infrastructures have 
been created by the national banking communities in each of the countries. 
In the view of the European authorities, the lack of common European 
payment instruments builds an obstacle to the unification of financial 
markets, and to the development of monetary exchanges between firms. 
The creation of common payment instruments for the Eurozone countries is 
part of this objective. Consequently, the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission have given the impetus to a project of harmonization 
of conditions of payment instrument usage, viz. the SEPA project (Single 
Euro Payments Area).  
The aim of this article is to provide an economic description of the 
industry of payment cards in Europe and to understand how the objectives of 
the SEPA will make this picture evolve. The payment cards industry provides 
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a good case study of a networks industry which organization has been 
understudied. Up to now, no published articles are available which identify 
the economic business models for card payments in European countries. In 
the view of the author this analysis is essential so as to be able to assess 
the economic consequences of SEPA for cardholders, for merchants and for 
banks. The article also demonstrates that it is still very difficult to predict the 
evolutions which might be brought about by the SEPA, because the 
regulatory context remains uncertain. The main actors in the industry pursue 
different objectives, which may be contradictory. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Firstly, an overview is 
provided of the possession and usage of payment cards in Europe, which 
enables an assessment of the development of payment cards with respect to 
other payment instruments 1. An analysis of the organization of the issuing 
and acquiring activities is then given along with a study of the role of the 
main players in the industry. A comparative table is used to explain the 
various forms of organizations of the payment card systems that have been 
established in each country. Finally, the article describes the main lines of 
the SEPA project, and provides assumptions about its impact on card 
payments.
  Possession and usage of payment cards in Europe 
To obtain a picture of the European payment cards industry, a good 
starting point is the presentation of a few statistics about payment card 
possession and usage in Europe. The figures reveal significant 
discrepancies between the various countries. Payment cards are widely 
used when the possession rates are high, when the number of acceptance 
points is high, and also, when consumers are not accustomed to using other 
electronic payment instruments such as direct debits or credit transfers. 
1 Payment card usage depends on the number of acceptance points, since this is a two-sided 
industry (see VERDIER, 2006, for a presentation of the relevant literature). M. VERDIER  129 
Possession 
Each European consumer holds on average 1.35 payment cards 2. Only 
the recent members of the European Union such as Poland count fewer 
cards than their number of inhabitants. However the differences in the 
possession rates do not reflect the differences in usage habits. For instance, 
in Germany, the number of cards per inhabitant is high, but there is relatively 
less use of payment cards as opposed to other countries such as Denmark 
or France. 
Figure 1 - Number of cards per inhabitant  
Source: BCE Blue Book, 2005 
Payment card usage 
In Europe, the payment card is the most widely used payment instrument 
in terms of volume. The usage of payment cards has grown at the expense 
of the check, which some countries like the Netherlands suppressed 
altogether when the Euro was introduced 3. The electronic purse is used for 
0.5% of payments in volume. In 2003, each European consumer made on 
average 46 payments by card, compared with 44 credit transfers, 38 direct 
debits, and 16 checks. However, these figures hide significant discrepancies 
between the different countries. 
2 Payment cards do not include cash withdrawal cards. 
3 Checks are used in Italy (15.6%), in the UK (18.2%), in Portugal (21%), in Greece (24.2%), in 
Ireland (25.1%), and in France (31.1%). In other countries, the usage of checks has fallen to 
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In Luxembourg, Portugal, Denmark, Greece and Sweden, payment cards 
account for more than a half of the transaction volume 4, while in Germany, 
in Austria or in the Czech Republic, cards are used to pay less than 15% of 
the expenses 5. In these countries, consumers prefer to use credit transfers, 
which represent less than half of the transaction volume 6.
Table 1 - Relative weight of scriptural payment instruments in the transaction volume 
Credit transfers  28.45% 





Source: BCE Blue Book, 2003 
However, these statistics on scriptural payments say nothing about cash 
usage in European countries. The increase in the volume and the value of 
cash withdrawals (respectively + 5.9% and + 7.1% between 2000 and 2004) 
suggests that cash usage has not decreased in Europe. In Germany, two 
thirds of the transactions are still paid with cash  7. The Germans and the 
Greeks make the largest amounts of cash withdrawals, both in terms of 
volume and in terms of value. 
Finally, if one looks at the weight of each country in the total transaction 
volume paid by card in 2005, one can note that half of all card payments are 
made in France and in the UK, which account for 22.7% and 27.2% 
respectively of the total number of transactions.  
Payment cards are widely used to pay for transactions of medium value. 
The average amount of a payment card transaction in Europe is 59.3 
euros 8. The smallest amounts (8 Euros in average) are paid cash or by e-
purse. The largest amounts are paid rather by direct debit (434.8 Euros), 
credit transfer (16,357.7 Euros) or by check (1,280 Euros). The average 
amount of a card payment varies from one country to the other. The 
discrepancies observed are due to differences in consumer habits and living 
4 2003 share of card payments in terms of transaction volumes: Luxembourg (60%), Portugal 
(58.4%), Denmark (56.5%), Greece (53.5%), Sweden (57.7%). 
5 2003 share of card payments in terms of transaction volumes: Germany (15%), Austria 
(11.3%), Czech Republic (8.35%). 
6 In 2003 share of credit transfers: Germany (43%), Austria (50.9%), Czech Republic (54.1%). 
7 Source: German Central Bank. 
8 Source: BCE Blue Book, 2005. M. VERDIER  131 
standards. For instance, the average amount of a card transaction is 
generally smaller in the countries where the purchasing power is weaker, 
and for which the average amount of a transaction is smaller, as is the case 
in Poland (30.6 Euros). However, one can also assume that a greater 
average value for card payments reveals a preference for cash to pay for 
small amounts. For instance, in Greece, the average value of a card 
payment is 109 Euros, while in Finland or in Sweden, this value is 
respectively 36.1 and 40.9 Euros. Consequently, one also needs to examine 
the ratio between the total value of card transactions and the Gross 
Domestic Product. In the United Kingdom, card payments account for 26% 
of GDP, followed by Portugal (18.2%), Denmark (17.2%), Finland, France 
and Sweden (around 15%), while in Germany and in Austria, this ratio is 
lower than 7%.  
The differences between European countries are also related to the type 
of payment cards that are held and used. There are mainly three types of 
payment cards in Europe: debit cards, which account for 50.7% of payment 
cards, charge cards (16%), and credit cards (33.2%). Many consumers use 
their credit cards as a deferred debit card and repay their bills at the end of 
each month. The UK is the largest issuer of credit cards: 45% of credit cards 
in circulation in Europe are issued by banks that are established in the UK. 
Payment cards are used to obtain credit mainly in the UK and in Austria. 
Figure 2 – Number of card payments per card per year,  
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(*) Including deferred debit cards. 
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It should also be noted that European consumers use their payment 
cards mainly in their country of residence, since cross-border transactions 
account for less than 3% of the volume of card payments in Europe. It is 
important to keep this figure in mind to assess the economic consequences 
of the SEPA. 
  The issuing and the acquiring activities 
This section begins by showing that the issuing and the acquiring 
activities are closely interrelated, since the payment cards industry is a two-
sided market. An analysis is then given of the organization of each side of 
the market. 
The payment card industry as a two-sided market 
Economic literature has shown that the payment cards industry is a "two-
sided" market, wherein payment card systems act as intermediaries between 
the cardholder on the one side and the merchant on the other side. In such 
markets, it is impossible to understand how one side is organized without 
looking at the other side, because of membership and usage externalities. 
The presence of membership externalities refers to the fact that the number 
of cardholders increases with the number of merchants equipped with 
payment terminals, and vice versa. There are also usage externalities 
because the cardholder can choose to pay with the payment card that 
generates the highest cost for the merchant, and sometimes, the merchant 
cannot refuse such a choice. Also, the merchant can choose to refuse 
payment cards, even if it is the preferred payment instrument for the 
consumer. 
To start a payment card business, banks have to engage either in the 
issuing activity, or the acquiring activity or both. Because of network 
externalities, if the bank becomes an issuer, the profitability of its activity will 
depend on the number of acceptance points for its cards. If it becomes an 
acquirer, its profitability will depend on the transaction volume, which is 
decided by the cardholders. Because of this, banks decided to establish 
partnerships to develop the usage of cards and to benefit from network 
effects and economies of scale. That is why in most European countries, 
they started to build payment card associations, which enable consumers to M. VERDIER  133 
use their payment cards in the same security conditions at all retail outlets. 
They act as intermediaries between banks, which, in exchange of 
membership fees, take advantage of common infrastructures and rules for 
card transactions.  
The European authorities use two notions to qualify payment card 
associations in Europe: "domestic payment schemes", such as the CB 
system in France 9, or ServiRed in Spain, and "international payment" card 
schemes such as Visa and MasterCard. But in the author's view, this 
classification is now ambiguous. Originally, "domestic" payment card 
systems were created by banking associations to process card transactions 
in a given country. However, these systems have opened up to all banks, 
regardless of country of establishment. Banks have also started to sign up 
merchants abroad, thus illustrating that this notion of "domestic" payment 
system is now irrelevant. But, as we will see, the notions of "domestic" 
payment card scheme and "international" payment card scheme are at the 
heart of the discussions about the SEPA. The "international" schemes, Visa 
and MasterCard, were created in the United States, and then extended their 
activities to the rest of the world by managing cross-border transactions, but 
also "domestic" transactions, as in Austria or in the UK for instance. Though 
the payment card industry is a two-sided market, each side of the market is 
described separately in the following sections. This artificial distinction is 
made to understand better the nature of this business. 
The issuing of payment cards and the cardholder side 
Payment cards can be issued either by banks or by financial institutions, 
merchants, or other commercial organisations. In Europe, the majority of 
payment cards are issued by banks. The card issuer chooses the networks 
in which the card can be used by the cardholders, and manages the risks 
associated to cardholding and usage. The cards that can be used by the 
cardholders in several acceptance networks are said to be co-badged. 
Today, in Europe, bank-issued payment cards frequently carry the logo of 
the "domestic" card payment system, and that of Visa or MasterCard, since 
these networks are mainly used for cross-border transactions. This is due to 
the fact that some "domestic" payment systems have signed agreements 
with Visa and MasterCard to extend their acceptance network. Sometimes 
9 For a presentation of the French payment cards industry, see VERDIER (2007). The CB 
system is not the only payment card system in France. 134     No. 69, 1
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the card issuer also chooses to sign a business partnership with some 
merchants in order to offer rewards to loyal consumers. The payment card is 
then said to be co-branded if it carries the brand of a merchant. A cardholder 
can hold one or more payment cards, which can be used in different 
acceptance networks. If a cardholder possesses at least two cards from two 
different systems, it is said to "multihome". The economic literature has 
shown that multihoming is an important feature of platform competition which 
influences the prices on both sides of the market (ROCHET & TIROLE, 
2003). 
Some card payment systems such as Diners Club, American Express, or 
JCB issue travel and entertainment charge cards. They are defined as 
closed-loop or proprietary networks since they decide directly which prices 
are paid by the cardholder and by the merchant. The issuers of travel and 
entertainment charge cards generally offer a wide range of services to 
consumers which have a high purchasing power. In most cases, private 
label cards are issued by financial institutions or by large retailers. For these 
institutions, payment cards are often a convenient means to develop their 
offer of consumer credit. They offer consumers a large variety of ways to 
reimburse their debt. The normal fall-back method is that the consumer pays 
through a series of fixed monthly repayments. An example is the Aurore card 
from the company Cetelem  10. In France and in Spain especially, large 
retailers issue cards through subsidiaries which are credit organizations (for 
example the Banque Accord for the supermarket chain Auchan). On the 
issuing side, there are also non-bank institutions, called "issuing 
processors", such as Atos Origin, TSYS, or Experian, which provide issuing 
banks with technical solutions and services such as account handling 
functions. 
The pricing of card payments differs greatly across Europe. There are 
mainly four types of cardholder fees: an annual fee per card, a card issuance 
fee, a fee per transaction, and the current account statement and billing 
information fee. Some issuers resort to "cash back" practices: i.e. they 
reimburse to the customers a portion of the cardholder fee according to the 
number of transactions they make. It appears that the annual cardholder fee 
is the most common way of charging card services to consumers in Europe.  
10 With its 13 million cards, Aurore is the largest private label card scheme in Europe. M. VERDIER  135 
The acquisition of transactions and the merchant side 
Payment card acquiring is the business of establishing contracts with 
merchants for card acceptance, and dealing with the transactions made at 
such merchants' payment terminals. When the cardholder presents a card to 
the merchant to purchase goods or services, the acquirer collects the card 
number and the transaction amount. If the transaction is "on line", the 
acquirer forwards this information through the card association network to 
the issuer, with a request for an authorization (otherwise, the transaction is 
said to be off-line). The acquirer also deals with fraud and responds to 
merchants' problems with card processing. Nowadays, banks can also 
outsource some of their acquiring functions to third party processors, such 
as First Data Corporation, or Atos Origin. By processing transactions for 
many banks, such third party processors enjoy large economies of scale, 
and today these firms control most of the processing business.  
The responsibility of signing up merchants in "open-loop" payment 
systems remains with the banks, who design contracts that are compatible 
with the rules of a given card payment system. Acquiring banks install 
payment terminals, which are bought or leased by the merchants. They also 
monitor the behaviour of the merchants, especially as regards risk 
management. Small merchants are frequently in relation with only a single 
bank, which provides them with various services, card payments aside. This 
explains the fact that cross-border acquiring remains limited. Acquirers have 
to respect several sets of rules, which differ from one card scheme to the 
other. However, these discrepancies are likely to disappear with the 
standardization projects of SEPA which are described in the following 
section.  
Processors have started to expand geographically. For instance, First 
Data is established in the United States, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Germany, Greece, Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary, Sweden, Norway, and even in 
Russia. The non-bank companies have gained increased importance in the 
payments industry. There is a trend towards mergers of companies which 
process card transactions. Some third party processors have even merged 
with ACHs (Automated Clearing Houses), for example Interpay and 
Transakstionsinstitut 11 in 2006, or Link and Voca  12, SSB and SIA  13 in 
2007.
11 Interpay is a Dutch company and Transaktionsintitut is a German company, a Netzbetreiber. 
The new entity is active under the name of "Equens", and in 2006 it has dealt with 7 billion 
transactions, which represents a market share of over 10% of the Euro zone. 136     No. 69, 1
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Generally, merchants pay a fixed annual fee for the installation and the 
maintenance of the payment terminal. They also pay a merchant service 
charge for each transaction either to their bank or to the payment system if it 
is a proprietary system. According to the Interim Report published by the 
European Commission in April 2006, the merchant service charges (MSC) 
paid by the merchants who accept the so-called "domestic" debit cards 
varied between 0.075% and 1.1975% in 2004. The average MSC is higher 
for the credit cards than for the debit cards, and higher for the smaller 
retailers. The number of POS terminals exceeds one million in France, in 
Spain, and in Italy 14. Popular destinations for tourists, such as Greece, are 
particularly well-equipped with acceptance points, in relation to their number 
of inhabitants. The number of POS terminals increases with the number of 
cardholders, because of membership externalities. Also, as pointed out by 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2002), strategic merchants are ready to accept cards 
even if they are costly, because this increases their market share if the 
consumers are informed about card acceptance. 
  Payment card schemes in Europe 
In the view of the European Central Bank, payment card systems 
generally consist of five subsystems, which may sometimes be integrated, 
viz. the card issuing subsystem, the transaction acquiring subsystem, the 
clearing and settlement subsystem, the card use subsystem, plus 
acceptance and transaction communication services. The overall card 
scheme management system is the main pillar that supports the architecture 
of the five subsystems. 
As was mentioned previously, payment platforms organize the 
interactions between the two sides of the market: the issuing and the 
acquiring side. A key characteristic of payment card systems is their legal 
organization, and their mode of governance. The organization that manages 
the card payment scheme can be either a non-profit  organization, managed 
by a group of banks, or it may be a for-profit organization and even be listed 
at the Stock exchange. For instance, MasterCard has been listed at the 
12 The Vocalink entity provides a pan-European clearing service. 
13 The Italian companies SSB and SIA merged their card processing activities. 
14 Number of payment terminals: Spain (1.109 million), France (1.095 million), Italy (1.045 
million). M. VERDIER  137 
Stock exchange since May 2006. However, most domestic payment card 
schemes, for example the CB system in France, are non-profit 
organizations. In these systems, the members can have various roles and 
statuses, and different rights and obligations. If the payment system 
manages the relationship with the acceptors directly, it is said to be a "three-
party" system. Otherwise it is known as a "four-party" system. Generally, 
however, the payment card system does not sign up merchants itself, except 
in Germany and in Austria. In these two countries, the domestic payment 
card schemes are "three-party" schemes, which manage the relationship 
with the acceptors directly. The processing of card transactions is done by 
network operators known as "Netzbetreiber". The German model is rather 
special compared with the rest of Europe, because the processing network 
is determined by the merchant. The card transaction in Germany is very 
closed to what is called "Lastschrift" (Direct Debit). 
Figure 3 - General organization of payment card systems (ECB) 
The payment systems also set up different rules for co-operation 
between banks, for risk management, and for transaction processing. For 
instance, the chip and PIN was not used in every European country before 
its introduction as a standard  15. In some countries, such as the UK, this 
resulted in higher fraud rates than in the systems which had set up more 
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demanding security rules (for example the CB system). Not all systems 
operate on line, nor do they all request an authorization for each transaction 
("on line" versus "off line" or "semi-offline" systems). In most payment 
systems, commissions called "interchange fees" are paid by the acquirer to 
the issuer for each transaction to ensure bank cooperation. Default 
interchange fees are defined multilaterally by the payment system, or 
bilaterally for each pair of acquiring / issuing banks. Sometimes, as in the CB 
system in France, the interchange fee is made up of a bilateral component 
and a multilateral component. The role of the interchange fees depends on 
the organization of the payment system in which they are applied  16. In 
some systems, they are used to optimize the transaction volume by helping 
to reach a balance between the issuing and the acquisition costs. In other 
systems, as in the CB system in France, interchange fees are paid by the 
acquirers to the issuers for the interbank services necessary to ensure co-
operation. In the Visa decision (July 2002), the European Commission has 
admitted that interchange fees are needed to support payment card 
systems, provided they are established with transparency, and calculated 
based on objective real costs. 
Table 2 - Domestic payment card schemes, various forms of organization 









Interbanking rules:ZKA which comprises 4 associations of banks (DSGV Savings Banks, BVR 
Cooperative Banks, BDB Commercial Banks, and VÖB State Banks) 
Brand: Electronik Cash "EC-Cash" 
No interchange fee.
Main issuing and acquiring processors:  
First Data Deutschland, issuing and acquiring processor (formerly GZS bought by First Data 
Corporation in August 2005)  
EKS (Euro Kartensysteme): Brand under which MasterCard cards are sold in Germany. 
ConCardis, B+S Card Services, Citibank: main acquirers for Visa and MasterCard transactions. 









Interbanking rules: 2 schemes 
Europay Austria: This company is owned by all the Austrian banks (7,6 million cards), issues cards 
for many banks, and acquires most debit card payment transactions. Also in charge of the ATM 
network. 
Visa Austria: Issuer and acquirer for transactions paid by credit cards « Visa Classic » and by debit 
card Electron. The transaction processing is subcontracted to the processor APSS, a company 
which was owned by the Austrian banks, and then was bought by First Data in August 2005. This 
company has become First Data Austria. 









Interbanking rules: 2 payment card schemes and one brand. 
Banksys: Payment card scheme for debit cards. Acquirer for transactions Bancontact/MisterCash. 
Processor for all card transactions, connection with the clearing and settlement chamber. 
Manufacturer of payment terminals. 
BankCard Company: National payment card scheme for debit card payments. Acquirer for the Visa 
and MasterCard transactions. Issuer for the Corporate and Business cards. 
Brand: BCC 








Interbanking rules and Clearing: 3 payment card schemes which provide clearing and settlement 
services under three different brands. 
ServiRed (1985): 33 million cards, 100 commercial and savings banks. Brand of the Visa Electron 
card. Processor of ServiRed: Sermepa 
Sistema 4B (1974): 16 million cards, 30 members, mainly commercial banks. Starting from the ATM 
network Telebanco 4B, in 1982, it extended its activity to the management of the acceptance points 
Telepago 4B.  









Interbanking rules: Groupement des Cartes Bancaires, CB. Non-for-profit organization which 
defines the interbanking rules for card payments. Owns the "e-rsb" authorization network. 
Interbank Clearing Network: in principle SIT/CORE.







Interbanking associations: 2 payment card schemes and 2 different brands. 
Associazione Bancaria Italiana (ABI): Non- profit payment card association which owns the 
national debit card brand PagoBancomat and the ATM network brand Bancomat. This association 
provides issuing and acquiring licenses to its subsidiary CO.GE.BAN, which itself offers licenses to 
banks. Owns the switching and authorization network RNI. 
Brand: PagoBancomat.  
CartaSi: Company which owns 200 shareholders, leader for the issuing of credit cards and deferred 
debit cards. Issuing processor for all credit cards. Acquirer for some transactions for small banks. 
Issuing and acquisition processor: SSB (Societa per i Servizi Bancari).This company is in charge of 
the processing activities for CartaSi, and for the acquisition of the merchants who accept American 












  Interbanking association: Currence, Company created in 2005. Shareholders: banks. Defines the 
common rules and the interchange fee. 
Issuing and acquiring processor: Interpay which owns a subsidiary for credit and deferred debit 










Interbanking association, clearing, issuing and acquisition processor: SIBS (Sociedade 
Interbancaria de Serviços). Non- profit organization of which shareholders are the issuing banks. 
SIBS owns the ATM network, the debit card acceptance point "Multibanco", and the electronic purse. 
It also proceeds to the clearing and settlement of payment card transactions, checks and direct 
















4 interbanking associations and one brand (Solo) 
S2 Card Services Ltd. (S2CS) Debit card scheme which replaced Switch, which is in charge of the 
brands Maestro UK and Solo (30 million cards). The company became Maestro UK. 
Visa UK and MMF (MasterCard UK Members Forum) Discussion forums for the main issuers, to 
which the membership is not compulsory. 
LINK: Non- profit organization which manages the ATM network. 
APACS (Association For Payment Clearing Services): represents the main banks on the questions 
pertaining to competition, responsible for 3 clearing chambers, and settlement issues. The APACS is 
organized by subgroups of common interest. One of these subgroups, the Card Payments Group 
defines a common policy on strategic issues (fraud prevention, etc.). 
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st Q. 2008 
The role of Visa and MasterCard 
The "international" payment card schemes, Visa and MasterCard, are 
mainly used in Europe for all cross-border transactions (except for the 
transactions routed by three-party systems such as American Express and 
Diners). These systems have developed their own authorization network, 
and also process the settlement of the transactions themselves, and define 
the level of interchange fees paid in their respective systems. 
Visa Europe is a not-profit organization, which counts over 4,500 
members. It operates under a license which is a property of the company 
Visa Inc 17. Visa Europe develops more and more specific products to meet 
the needs of the consumers from this geographical zone. In June 2006, Visa 
Europe launched its own debit card scheme, which it claimed to be 
compliant with the SEPA cards framework, the V-Pay system. Visa markets 
mainly three brands: Visa, Visa Electron (Debit card) and Plus (withdrawal 
card). The Visa cards are widely held in France, in the UK, and in Spain: 
63% of its cards in Europe are held by consumers from these three 
countries.  
MasterCard international also does business in all European countries. It 
was listed on the Stock exchange in May 2006. The most widespread 
products are the Maestro debit card, and the Cirrus withdrawal card. Around 
63% of MasterCard cards are held by cardholders who live in the UK, 
France, Spain, and Turkey. The highest number of Maestro cards are in 
Germany, in the UK, in Italy and in the Netherlands. The market share of 
MasterCard in terms of the number of cards that carry the MasterCard or 
Maestro brand is higher than Visa cards in all European countries, except in 
France, Portugal, and Spain. 
17 Visa Europe holds less than 25% of Visa Inc., and is committed to sell 50% of its shares 
when it is listed on the Stock exchange. M. VERDIER  141 
  The creation of a Single Euro Payments Area 
Presentation of the SEPA project 
It is quite a difficult exercise to define the SEPA project, because, as we 
will see, the main players do not define the project in the same way. 
Originally, the European Central Bank and the European Commission gave 
the initial impetus to the creation of a single Euro payments area. The 
project was not however launched by the European Authorities, but by banks 
and other players which built a working group in 2002, the European 
Payments Council (EPC) to reflect on the definition of payment instruments 
and about strategic orientation concerning the standardization of the 
payment systems. This initiative has progressed, at times with some 
uncertainty, in parallel with the regulatory frameworks defined by the 
European Commission and the ECB. In order to provide a harmonized legal 
environment, the European Commission has established a Payment 
Services Directive (PSD), which was voted by the European Parliament in 
April 2007.  
All players will agree that the aim of the SEPA is to enable each 
European consumer to pay in Euros, and with the same payment 
instruments, under the same conditions all over Europe 18. To achieve this 
result, the intention of the project is to create pan-European payment 
schemes for three scriptural payment instruments: the SEPA credit transfer, 
the SEPA direct debit, and the card.
The European Authorities follow several roads to achieve the objective of 
a single European market, some of which may contradict each other. On the 
one hand, they wish to reinforce the monetary "coherence" of the Euro zone 
countries by harmonizing the conditions under which the different payment 
instruments are used. On the other hand, European regulatory authorities 
intend to provide banks with incentives to choose their prices transparently, 
and to gain in efficiency. The cost reductions for banks should trigger a 
decrease in the prices paid by consumers for electronic payment 
instruments. Another study conducted by the European Payments Council 
(EPC) in March 2003 shows that the cost of cash in Europe amounts to 50 
18 SEPA initially covers transactions in euros, but will eventually involve all European Union 
Member States, plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. 142     No. 69, 1
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billion Euros per year, of which 65% is paid by the banks. The real cost of 
cash is not paid by its users, which forces banks to use cross-subsidies 
between the payment instruments that are responsible for inefficiencies 19.
The view of the European Commission is that the best way to unify the 
market is to promote competition. But, in the opinion of the author, this 
position must be clarified in the difficult context of a two-sided payment card 
industry, which exhibits network externalities, and large economies of scale. 
The first logical step, to achieve the SEPA, is to consider the links between 
the payment systems. In order to be able to deal with payment orders 
coming from all over Europe, the various payment infrastructures will have to 
become interoperable. Interoperability stems from the adoption of common 
standards, links between the networks, and participation criteria which do 
not rely on geographical implantation.  
The SEPA cards framework 
In September 2005, the work conducted by the EPC resulted in the 
publication of a common interoperability framework for payment card 
systems, the SEPA Cards Framework (SCF). This project defines the main 
principles and technical conditions to enable cardholders to use their cards 
in each payment card system. The interoperability between payment card 
schemes depends on the definition of common technical standards 20.
According to the SCF, membership of payment card systems must be 
based on principles of transparency and non-discrimination. Banks should 
be free to become members of any card scheme that is SEPA compliant 
with a single license that will cover the Euro countries. Furthermore, in the 
view of the European Commission, tariffs for payment card services should 
be harmonized so as to become independent of the geographical zone 
where they are used. The current systems will have to start unbundling their 
offer of services, so that banks will have a choice between several channels 
for routing and processing their transactions. The vertical integration of 
payment schemes will have to be replaced by other structures, so as to 
increase competition and economies of scale. The domestic payment card 
19 For an excellent survey of the debates about cost-based pricing of payment instruments, see 
Van HOVE (2004). 
20 For instance, the cards will have to be equipped with the EMV technology, a standard 
defined for chip cards by EMVCo, an entity created by Europay, Visa and MasterCard. M. VERDIER  143 
schemes have already started to adjust to these new requirements for 
instance, by separating the marketing divisions from the schemes, or by 
recruiting staff from non-bank organizations. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, Interpay split to form Currence, to take charge of the 
governance and supervision of the payment instruments in the Netherlands, 
while Interpay 21 itself remained in charge of the card processing.  
The EPC identified three options with regard to the evolution of payment 
systems to meet the SEPA requirements. In the first option, domestic 
payment card schemes are replaced by the international systems Visa and 
MasterCard, which would, presumably, have become SEPA compliant. In 
the second option, some national payment card schemes would extend their 
activities to other European countries, or establish partnerships with other 
systems. In the third option, several types of payment systems would coexist 
by cobranding and interoperability agreements. 
The economic consequences of the SCF 
There are various economic paradoxes associated with the creation of 
the SEPA Cards Framework. The first one is related to the costs of a project 
that is created for a small amount of transactions. To date, cross border card 
payments account for 3% of the transaction volume in Europe. There is still 
uncertainty upon the fact that the SEPA will make the demand for cross-
border payments rise. So the European Authorities run the risk of creating 
an upheaval of the current organization of payment card schemes, which 
work quite well, for 3% of the transactions. Only the reactions of the market 
players will say if it was worth it. The second paradox stems from the fact 
that economy is used by the European authorities to justify political 
purposes. And also, as mentioned before, the positions of the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank are not perfectly aligned. 
The ECB favours the development of one or more European payment 
card schemes. Several reasons account for this viewpoint. The absence of a 
"European" payment card scheme could be detrimental to the interests of 
the European Union. The countries that have significant economic power 
have all created their own payment card scheme, for example Visa and 
MasterCard in the US, JCB in Japan or even CUP in China. The strategic 
control of payment systems is a major political issue. Payment systems 
21 In 2006, Interpay became EQUENS. 144     No. 69, 1
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collect and manage a large amount of data on consumer behaviour which 
could be used by other countries for purposes other than those for which 
they are intended. What is more, the monitoring of payment systems is an 
important aspect of the management of systemic risks born by the financial 
institutions. In the absence of one or more European payment system, 
European banks are in danger of losing influence in the management of risk 
in card payments. 
Meanwhile, the initial aim of the European Commission is to increase 
competition between payment systems, and to generate a reduction of costs 
of electronic payment instruments. At the end of the project, if the prices of 
card payments are only determined as a result of competition between Visa 
and MasterCard, the European authorities risk having an outcome that goes 
against their initial objective. In actual fact, the domestic payment systems 
have worked very well until now, with relatively low interchange fees and low 
costs in comparison to the Visa and MasterCard offers. 
The regulatory authorities face three options to tackle these strategic 
issues. Either they can let the market react to the Payment Services 
Directive and the SEPA projects. Or they can provide banks with incentives 
to create a pan-European card scheme, for instance by allowing higher 
interchange fees to increase the number of card issuers. Finally, they could 
decide to force banks to create such a pan-European card scheme. If the 
outcome of SEPA is market-driven, the competition between payment 
systems could end up in the domination of Visa and MasterCard. Such an 
international duopoly is ideally positioned to take advantage of SEPA. Both 
companies have created a (supposedly) SCF-compliant debit card scheme, 
V-Pay for Visa and Maestro for MasterCard. They also have an extensive 
installed base of consumers, a solid reputation, and a sound network 
infrastructure. For instance, in the United Kingdom, since July 2002, the 
domestic debit card brand "Switch" migrated to Maestro. However, the 
pressure exerted by the users might well influence banks' decisions. An 
illustration of this is when the Belgian banks had decided to migrate to 
Maestro for debit cards by the end of 2007. This decision has been 
suspended because of high merchant resistance. European banks are also 
aware of the necessity to have their own card payment infrastructure so as 
not to be captive of Visa and MasterCard pricing strategies. Consequently, 
some European schemes have already started to join forces to create a pan 
European payment card scheme. Six payment systems (PagoBancomat, 
Multibanco, Link, Euro6000, Electronic Cash, Eufiserv) have launched the 
brand Euro Alliance of Payment Systems.  M. VERDIER  145 
If the SEPA objectives are reached, then competition between banks in 
the issuing and acquisition businesses should increase. Since payments 
account for a third of banks' retail revenues  22, then banks will have to 
design strategies so as to maintain the same level of profits in this context. 
In the view of the author, it is important to keep in mind that banks' profits 
are also reinvested to promote financial innovations, or quality 
improvements. So a zero profit situation is not desirable from the point of 
view of social welfare maximisation. Why will competition increase? On the 
acquisition side, technical standardization should encourage the 
development of cross-border activities, since acquiring banks will be able to 
sign up merchants abroad more easily. On the issuing side, the new legal 
framework defined by the PSD should trigger the entry of non-bank 
organizations into the payments industry. For instance, mobile network 
operators could start issuing cards using the Payment Institution status of 
the directive. 
To improve or maintain their competitiveness, banks have two options. 
The first idea is to establish partnerships or integrate horizontally. The 
search for critical mass should enable them to offer price reductions, new 
services, and to capitalize on the investments needed to set up common 
technical standards. For instance, BNP Paribas and Natixis Banque 
Populaire started to build a common platform to deal with retail payments, 
which is managed by a common subsidiary "Partecis". There is also a 
second strategic option. Banks could start outsourcing their payments 
activities to third-party processors. The processors have recorded a dramatic 
increase in their turnover, which results in cross-border vertical and 
horizontal mergers. For instance, the company Atos Worldline bought the 
activities of Banksys and BCC (vertical merger). The processor First Data 
Corporation also bought several companies to extend its activity 
geographically. 
The amount and the structure of the revenues obtained by banks for 
retail payments should change. Banks will have to make a trade-off between 
the search for economies of scale on card payments and the development of 
new services, such as payments using mobile phones. The amount of 
investment needed to become SEPA-compliant should vary between 60 and 
80 million Euros over a period lasting between 3 and 5 years 23. According 
to a report conducted by the European Central Bank, under the assumption 
22 Source: AGEFI Hebdo, March 2007. 
23 Source: AGEFI Hebdo. 146     No. 69, 1
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of an ideal scenario for the SEPA 24, banks' revenues should decrease by 
7.6% and the costs should diminish by 1.3%. If the European Commission 
demands more transparency on payment transaction prices for consumers 
and merchants, banks will stop practising cross-subsidies between payment 
instruments. This should result in a fall in the use of the most-costly payment 
instruments. According to the ECB report, SEPA will generate economies 
only if the volume of electronic transactions increases, at the expense of 
cash and checks. 
  Conclusion 
The organization of payment card systems in Europe should evolve 
dramatically with the implementation of SEPA. The strategies applied by the 
players will depend essentially on the decisions of the regulatory bodies and 
the interaction between the systems, the banks, the non-bank organizations, 
the merchants and the users. 
It is difficult to forecast the competitive equilibrium that results from 
platform competition in two-sided markets, because the reaction of one side 
depends on its anticipation of the behaviour of the other side. Cardholders 
will be able to use the least costly payment instrument for each transaction, 
because of increased transparency. They may also choose to adopt new 
payment instruments if significant innovations appear on the market. On the 
other hand, merchants have some bargaining power against banks, since 
they can choose to develop their own payment services, using some of the 
infrastructure developed by payment service providers. For instance, large 
retailers could try to create payment platforms which could be used by all 
their European subsidiaries. The outcome of competition will depend on the 
interaction between the infrastructure owners and potential new entrants to 
schemes or users of the infrastructure to enable them to offer new services. 
This trade-off between competition on upstream and downstream markets is 
a classical issue in network economics. 
24 Source: ECB Occasional Paper no. 71, August 2007. M. VERDIER  147 
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